Inside the scam jungle: a closer look at 419 scam email operations by unknown
Isacenkova et al. EURASIP Journal on Information Security 2014, 2014:4
http://jis.eurasipjournals.com/content/2014/1/4
RESEARCH Open Access
Inside the scam jungle: a closer look at 419
scam email operations
Jelena Isacenkova1*, Olivier Thonnard2, Andrei Costin1, Aurélien Francillon1 and David Balzarotti1
Abstract
419 scam (also referred to as Nigerian scam) is a popular form of fraud in which the fraudster tricks the victim into
paying a certain amount of money under the promise of a future, larger payoff.
Using a public dataset, in this paper, we study how these forms of scam campaigns are organized and evolve over time.
In particular, we discuss the role of phone numbers as important identifiers to group messages together and depict
the way scammers operate their campaigns. In fact, since the victim has to be able to contact the criminal, both email
addresses and phone numbers need to be authentic and they are often unchanged and re-used for a long period of
time. We also present in detail several examples of 419 scam campaigns, some of which last for several years -
representing them in a graphical way and discussing their characteristics.
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1 Introduction
Nigerian scam [1], also called ‘419 scam’ as a reference to
the 419 section in the Nigerian penal code [2], has been
a known problem for several decades. The name encom-
passes many variations of this type of scam, like advance
fee fraud, fake lottery, black money scam, etc. Originally,
the 419 scam phenomenon started by postal mail, and
then evolved into a business run via fax first, and email
later. 419 scam is a popular form of fraud in which the
fraudster tricks the victim into paying a certain amount of
money under the promise of a future, larger payoff. The
prosecution of such criminal activity is complicated [3]
and can often be evaded by criminals. As a result, reports
of such crime still appear in the social media and online
communities, e.g. 419scam.org [4], exist to mitigate the
risk and help users to identify scam messages.
Nowadays, 419 scam is often perceived as a particu-
lar type of spam. However, while most of the spam is
sent today in bulk through botnets and by compromised
machines, 419 scam activities are still largely performed
in a manual way. Moreover, the underlying business and
operation models differ. Spammers trap their victims
through engineering effort, whereas scammers rely on
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human factors: pity, greed, and social engineering tech-
niques. Scammers use very primitive tools (if any) com-
pared with other forms of spam where operations are
often completely automated. A distinctive characteristic
of email fraud is the communication channel set up to
reach the victim: from this point of view, scammers tend
to use emails and/or phone numbers as their main con-
tacts [5], while other forms of spam are more likely to
forward their victims to specific URLs. For instance, a
previous study of spam campaigns [6] (in which scam
was considered a subset of spam) indicates that 59% of
spammessages contain a URL. However, even though 419
scam messages got eclipsed by the large amount of spam
sent by botnets, they still pose a persistant problem that
causes substantial personal financial losses for a number
of victims all around the world.
The traditional spam and scam (not 419) scenarios have
been already thoroughly studied (e.g. [6,7]), where a big
part of existing unsolicited bulk email identification tech-
niques rely on high volumes of similar messages. However,
419messages aremore likely to be sent in lower copies and
fromwebmail accounts. Thus, criminals aim to stay unno-
ticed by the traditional spam filters and avoid drawing
attention to abused webmail accounts. The exact distribu-
tion methods of 419 scam messages have not been stud-
ied as deeply as, for example, the distribution of botnet
spam. However, based on Microsoft Security Intelligence
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Reports [8], 419 scam messages constitute on average to
8% of email spam traffic (data over the last 5 years).
A recent study by Costin et al. [5] describes the use of
phone numbers in a number of malicious activities. The
authors show that the phone numbers used by scammers
are often active for a long period of time and are reused
over and over in different emails, making them an attrac-
tive feature to link together scam messages and identify
possible campaigns. In this work, we test this hypothe-
sis by using phone numbers and other email features to
automatically detect and study scam campaigns by using
a public dataset. To the best of our knowledge, this is the
first in-depth study of 419 email campaigns. While a pre-
liminary version of this study was published in [9], this is
an extended version of the study.
Our goal is to study how scammers orchestrate their
scam campaigns, by looking at the interconnections
between email accounts, phone numbers, and email topics
used by scammers. To this aim, we use a novel multi-
criteria decision algorithm to effectively cluster scam
emails that are sharing a minimal number of common-
alities, even in the presence of more volatile features.
Because of this set of commonalities, scam emails origi-
nating from the same scammer(s) are likely to be grouped
together, enabling us to gain insights into scam cam-
paigns. Additionally, we also evaluate the quality and
consistency of our clustering results. To this aim, we per-
form a threshold sensitivity analysis, as well as evaluate the
homogeneity of clusters using the graph compactness and
Adjusted Rand Index as metrics.
In our analysis, we have identified over 1,000 differ-
ent campaigns and, for most of them, phone numbers
represent the cornerstone that allows us to link the differ-
ent pieces together. We also discovered some larger-scale
campaigns (so-called ‘macro-cluster’), which are made of
loosely inter-connected scam clusters reflecting different
operations of the same scammers. We believe these can
be attributed to different scam runs orchestrated by the
same criminal groups, as we observe the same phone
numbers or email accounts being reused across different
sub-campaigns.
As demonstrated by our experiments, our methods and
findings could be leveraged to pro-actively identify new
scam operations (or variants of previous ones) by quickly
associating a new scam to ongoing campaigns. We believe
that this would facilitate the work of law enforcement
agencies in the prosecution of scammers. Our approach
could also be leveraged to improve investigations of other
cybercrime schemes by logging and investigating various
groups of cybercriminals based on their online activities.
In this regard, our methodology already proved its util-
ity in the context of other security investigations, such as
in the analysis of rogue AV campaigns [10], spam botnets
operations [11], and targeted attacks [12].
The rest of the paper is organized as follows:We start by
describing the scam dataset (Section 3), to which we apply
our cluster analysis technique to extract scam campaigns,
and compare the usage of email addresses and phone
numbers (Section 4). In Section 5, we focus on a number
of individual campaigns to present their characteristics.
Finally, we draw our conclusions in Section 6.
2 Related work
Scammers employ various techniques to harvest money
from ingenuous victims. Tive [13] introduced the tricks
of 419 fee fraud and the philosophy of the tricksters
behind. Stajano andWilson [14] studied a number of scam
techniques and demonstrated the importance of security
engineering operations. Herley [15] analysed attack deci-
sions as binary classification problems studying the case
of 419 scammers. The author looks into the economical
aspects of adversaries trying to understand how scammers
find viable victims out of millions of users, so that their
business still remains profitable. A brief summary of 419
scam schemes was presented by Buchanan and Grant [3]
indicating that Internet growth has facilitated the spread
of cyber fraud. They also emphasized the difficulties of
adversary prosecution - one of the main reasons why 419
scam is still an issue today. A more recent work by Oboh
et al. [16] discussed the same problem of prosecution in a
more global context taking the Netherlands as an example.
Another work by Goa et al. [17] proposed an ontol-
ogy model for scam 419 email text mining demonstrating
high precision in detection. A work by Pathak et al. [6]
analysed email spam campaigns sent by botnets, describ-
ing their patterns and characteristics. The authors also
showed that 15% of the spammessages contained a phone
number. A recent patent has been published by Coomer
[18] on a technique that detects scam and spam emails
through phone number analysis. This is the first mention-
ing of phone numbers being used for identifying scam,
but with no technical implementation details. Costin et al.
[5] studied the role of phone numbers in various online
fraud schemes and empirically demonstrated it’s signifi-
cance in 419 scam domain. Our work extends the study
by focusing on scam email and campaign characterization
that relies on phone numbers and email addresses used by
scammers.
3 Dataset
In this section, we describe the dataset we used for ana-
lyzing 419 scam campaigns and provide some statistics
of the scam messages. There are various sources of scam
often reported by users and aggregated afterwards by
dedicated communities, forums, and other online activ-
ity groups. The data chosen for our analysis come from
419scam.org - a 419 scam aggregator - as it provides a
large set of preprocessed data: email bodies, headers, and
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some already extracted emails attributes, like the scam
category and the phone numbers. Note that IP addresses
data are absent. We downloaded the emails for a period
spanning from January 2009 until August 2012.
In our study, we also exploited the fact that the phone
numbers can indicate a geographical location, typically
the country where the phone is registered. Although it
does not prove the origin of the message or the scam-
mer, still it references a country of a scam operation, and
improves victim’s level of confidence in the received mes-
sage. For example, receiving a new partnership offer from
UK could seem suspicious if the phone contact has a
Nigerian prefix, or a fake lottery notification with contact
details originating from an African country while the vic-
tim being from Europe. Moreover, as shown in a previous
study [5], 419 scam mobile phone numbers are precise in
indicating the country of residence of the phone owner
(scammer) as few roaming cases were found. Therefore,
the phone attribute is precise enough to indicate geo-
graphical origins.
The resulting dataset consists of 36,761 messages with
11,768 unique phone numbers. The general statistics of
the data are shown in Table 1. A first thing to notice is that
the number of email addresses is three times bigger than
the number of phone numbers, emphasizing the facility
to acquire mailboxes for malevolent purposes. However,
still the ratio is quite low indicating rather cheap and easy
access to the phone numbers. Another specificity of this
dataset is that each message can contain several email
addresses and phone numbers, where the number of dif-
ferent email addresses can be as high as five per message:
from email address, reply email, and other email addresses
indicated in the body of the messages. Hence, although
we collected only 36,761 messages, we extracted 112,961
email addresses from them.
In our dataset, we did not notice any significant bursts
of scam messages (verified on a monthly basis) during
the three year span, suggesting that the email messages
were constantly distributed over time. It is also impor-
tant to note that the dataset is mostly limited to the
European and African regions (with only a few Asian
samples), which is due to the way the website owners




Total email addresses 112,961
Unique email addresses 34,723
Total phone numbers 41,320
Total unique phone numbers 11,768
Number of countries 12
are collecting and classifying the data. Nevertheless, the
geographical distribution of the mentioned continents
is reflected in our dataset, excluding only some minor
actors.
To better understand the dataset, we look at the time
during which emails and phones were advertised by scam-
mers in scam messages. Seventy one percent of the email
addresses in our dataset were used only during 1 day. The
remaining were used for an average duration of 79 days
each. Phone numbers have a longer longevity than email
addresses: 51% of the phone numbers were used only for 1
day; the rest were used on average for 174 days (around 6
months) hence making it an important feature in our data
clustering analysis.
Table 2 summarizes the phone number geographi-
cal distribution. UK numbers are twice as common as
Nigerian, and three times more common than the ones
from Benin, the third biggest group. The Netherlands and
Spain are the leading countries in Europe. Note that UK
should be considered as a special case. As reported by
419scam.org and Costin et al. [5], all UK phone numbers
in this dataset belong to personal numbering services -
services used for forwarding phone calls to other phone
numbers and serving as a masking service of the real des-
tination for the callee. In our dataset there are 44% of
such phone numbers (all with UK prefix), another 44% are
mobile phone numbers, 12% are fixed lines [5], and only
less than 1% of the phones are non-existent.
The initial 419 scam messages are also labeled by the
419scam.org [4] with a category. Around 64% of the emails
are assigned to the category named ‘419 scam’, which
is a subcategory of 419 scam and refers specifically to
financial fraud types, e.g., transactions, lost funds, etc.
As reported by [4], most of the remaining emails (24%)
belong to ‘Fake lottery’ category. However, this distribu-
tion has been changing over time as shown in Figure 1.
Especially, a big difference can be observed between 2009
Table 2 Phones by countries
Country Total phones Total (%)
United Kingdom 4,499 43
Nigeria 3,121 30
Benin 1,448 14
South Africa 562 5
Spain 372 4
Netherlands 263 3
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Figure 1 Scam email categories over time.
and 2011, where in 2011, the ‘419 scam’ became a dom-
inant category. As of August 2012, there was five times
more emails of ‘419 scam’ than of ‘fake lottery’ letters.
This might be due to an outdated categorization process,
as scam topics - like spam - may change and evolve over
time. For this reason, in the next section, we describe our
process to automatically identify the scam topics based on
the word frequencies in the messages. We also observe
that most of the ‘fake lottery’ scams are associated with
European phone numbers suggesting that this category
is sent to a targeted audience. In the majority of ‘419
scam’ cases, scammers use as many Nigerian phone num-
bers (Figure 2) as of UK ones. African phone numbers
(Figure 2) with UK share being equivalent to Nigerian.
Also notice that Benin becomes a much bigger player
starting from the beginning of 2011. Hence, the geo-
graphical targets may vary with the topics and objectives
persuaded by the accomplices.
4 Data analysis methods
In this section, we describe methods used for identify-
ing groups of similar 419 scam emails that are believed
to be part of the campaigns and then present the results.
We use two different metrics to evaluate the quality and
consistency of the created clusters (campaigns). Finally,
we extract the most repetitive keywords from the body
of the scam messages in order to improve their topic
categorization.
4.1 Scam email clustering: the TRIAGE approach
To identify groups of scam emails that are likely part of a
campaign orchestrated by the same group of people, we
have clustered all scam messages using TRIAGE - a soft-
ware framework for security datamining that takes advan-
tage of multi-criteria data analysis to group events based
on subsets of common elements (subsequently called fea-
tures). Thanks to this multi-criteria clustering approach,
TRIAGE identifies complex patterns in data, unveiling
sometimes varying relationships among series of con-
nected or disparate events. TRIAGE is best described as a
security tool designed for intelligence extraction helping
to determine the patterns and behaviors of the intrud-
ers (i.e., the tactics, techniques and procedures, or TTPs),
highlighting ‘how’ they operate rather than ‘what’ they
do. The framework [19] has already demonstrated its util-
ity in the context of other security investigations, e.g.,
rogue AV campaigns [10], spam botnets [11] and targeted
attacks [12].
Figure 3 illustrates the TRIAGE workflow, as applied to
our scam dataset. In step 1, a number of email charac-
teristics (or features) are selected and defined as deci-
sion criteria for linking the emails. Such characteristics
include the sender email address (the from), the email
subject, the sending date, the reply address (as found
in the email header), the phone number and any other
email address found in the message itself (email body).
In step 2, TRIAGE builds relationships among all email
samples with respect to the selected features using appro-
priate similarity metrics. More specifically, we used var-
ious string-oriented similarity measures commonly used
in information retrieval, such as the Levenshtein similar-
ity (for the subject) and theN-gram similarity (for features
as from, reply, email body). As shown in [20], N-gram sim-
ilarity can be seen as a generalization of Levenshtein and
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Figure 2 ‘419 scam’ category phone numbers over time by countries.
has proved to work better with short strings. However, N-
gram can be computationally expensive. For this reason,
we decided to use it solely for email addresses, for which
it is somehow more critical to have a reliable compari-
son method, than for email subjects which tend also to be
longer and thus more expensive to compare. For features
as phone and date, we simply used the equality compar-
ison method - as this method appeared to us to be the
most appropriate to capture the semantics between two
different feature values in this particular case.
At step 3, the individual feature similarities are fused
using an aggregation model reflecting a high-level behav-
ior defined by the analyst, who can impose, e.g., that at
least k highly similar email features (out of n) are required
to attribute different samples to the same campaign. The
tool allows to assign different weights to the features, so
as to give higher or lower importance to certain features.
Table 3 shows the particular set of weights used for
this analysis, in which we emphasize the importance of
the phone numbers and the email subjects. The features
related to the sender email addresses were given amedium
importance, whereas the sending date was given a much
lower importance. The fused similarity value (or aggre-
gated value) is then used as input to a classical graph
clustering algorithm, such as minimal cut or connected
components, which are able to recover clusters of arbi-
trary size and shape.
At this stage, it is important to stress that, except maybe
for the phone number used by the scammer (unless this
number is fake), none of the other features included in the
clustering analysis can be considered alone to be sufficient
to attribute scam emails to the same criminals. For exam-
ple, the fact that the same (or similar) sender email address
was used in two scam messages, even sent on the same
Figure 3 TRIAGE workflow on scam dataset.
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Email body 0.10 
Date 0.05 
date, does not necessarily mean that these two messages
originate from the same individual(s). Only one or two
common features can appear merely due to a coincidence,
to a commonly seen pattern, or perhaps to some com-
monly used technique shared by scammers. This moti-
vates our choice for a multi-criteria fusion model that
incorporates various weights defined according to a fuzzy
linguistic quantifier (also referred to as Regular Increasing
Monotone or RIM quantifier [21,22]), which allows us to
model fusion strategies such as at least k strong correla-
tions are required to link two scam emails. Note that other
fuzzy linguistic models may be considered to model the
portion of criteria to be satisfied in the aggregation step,
e.g., few, some, half, many, or most of the features can be
required to be strongly correlated.
The TRIAGE framework provides advanced aggregation
modelling capabilities, such as the Choquet integral - a
fuzzy integral that aggregates a set of scores by not only
taking into account importance factors assigned to indi-
vidual criteria, but also interactions among subsets of
criteria [23,24]. This enables us to also include interac-
tions among groups of criteria (i.e., email features), like
synergies and redundancies. For this analysis, we have
assigned synergies to coalitions of features involving at
least the phone number of the scammer, so as to boost the
overall similarity between emails having the same phone
number, plus one additional feature in common. Inversely,
some redundancy was put on certain combinations of
email address-related features, such as (reply, email body),
in order to diminish their redundancy effect on the overall
similarity score. The definition of this aggregation model
and its parameters must be guided by domain expert
knowledge; in our case, we leveraged the insights gained
previously by analyzing the role of phone numbers and
email addresses in such scam operations in [5].
As an outcome (step 4), TRIAGE identifies multi-
dimensional clusters (MDCs), which in this analysis are
clusters of scam emails in which any pair of emails is
linked by a number of common traits. As explained in
[19], a decision threshold can be chosen such that unde-
sired linkage between attacks are eliminated, i.e., to drop
any irrelevant connection that could result from a com-
bination of small values or an insufficient number of
correlated features. The result of this sensitivity analysis
is shown in Figure 4, which represents the total number
of clusters (MDCs) found by the algorithm for increas-
ing values of the decision threshold. The best trade-off
between quality and completeness of the clustering pro-
cess is usually obtained for threshold values correspond-
ing to the maximum number of clusters [19], i.e., we chose
here to set the threshold at 0.35. Given the set of impor-
tances and interactions defined above, we can easily verify
that the outcome of the Choquet aggregation will exceed
this threshold for combinations of any two features involv-
ing similarities for the phone number and at least one
other feature (besides the date). Any coalition of three (or
more) similar features will also exceed the threshold and
will lead to the formation of a cluster.
4.1.1 k-additive Choquet integral
The Choquet integral is defined with respect to a so-called
fuzzy measure. Given a set of criteria N (e.g., email fea-
tures), a fuzzy measure is simply a set function used to
define, in some sense, the importance (or strength) of
any subset belonging to the power set of N . More for-
mally, a fuzzy measure (alternatively called a capacity in
the literature) is defined as follows:
Definition. (Fuzzy measure): Let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} be
the index set of n criteria. A fuzzy measure [25] (or capac-
ity [26]) is a set function v : 2N → [0, 1] which is
monotonic (i.e., v(A) ≤ v(B) whenever A ⊂ B) and sat-
isfies v(∅) = 0. The measure is normalized if in addition
v(N ) = 1.
In multi-criteria decision making, a fuzzy measure is
thus a set of 2n real values where each value can be viewed
as the degree of importance of a combination of criteria
(also called a coalition, in particular in game theory).
However, since the exponential complexity of fuzzy
measures makes them impractical for a decision maker
to define them manually, Grabisch proposed a sub-model
called k-order additive fuzzy measures, or shorter k-
additive fuzzy measures [27]. The idea is to construct
a fuzzy measure where the interaction among criteria is
limited to groups of size k (or less). For example, in a
2-additive fuzzy measure, we can only model pairwise
interactions among criteria, but no interactions in groups
of 3 or more.
In MCDA, k-additive fuzzy measures have proved to
provide a good trade-off between complexity and flexibil-
ity of the model. Instead of 2n − 2 values, they require
only
∑k
i=1(ni ) values to be defined. 1-additive fuzzy mea-
sures are just ordinary additive measures (for which only
n values are needed), but they are usually too restrictive
for an accurate representation of complex problems1. In
practice, 2-additivity seems to be the best compromise
Isacenkova et al. EURASIP Journal on Information Security 2014, 2014:4 Page 7 of 18
http://jis.eurasipjournals.com/content/2014/1/4
Figure 4 Sensitivity analysis on the decision threshold used in the TRIAGE clustering.
between low complexity and richness of the model [27]. In
this case, only n(n + 1)/2 values need to be defined.
From a practical viewpoint, a decision maker may thus
consider defining a 2-additive fuzzy measure since it
appears to be a good trade-off between complexity of the
model (number of values to determine) and its effective-
ness and flexibility to include interactions (synergies or
redundancies) among pairs of features. To do this, a com-
monly used approach consists to calculate the Choquet
integral directly from the values provided by the decision
maker for the interaction indices I2(A), and by using the




















where φi is the Shapley value of v as defined in [29] (which
are directly related to the importances of individual fea-
tures), Iij is the interaction index between criteria i and j
(as defined in [30]), and z is the vector of pairwise similar-
ities obtained from the comparison of email features for
any pair of scam messages.
As pointed out by Grabisch in [28], the expression (1)
here above is remarkable for two reasons:
- It explains clearly the meaning of the interaction
index and Shapley value: a positive interaction
induces a conjunctive aggregation of scores, while a
negative interaction induces a disjunctive aggregation
(it is sufficient that one score is high). Clearly, the
Shapley value is the linear part of the model, while
interaction is the nonlinear part.
- Coefficients are non-negative, and if the capacity is
normalized, they sum up to 1. In other words, it
means that the Choquet integral is a convex
combination of the scores zi on all criteria, and of all
disjunctive and conjunctive combinations of scores
on pairs of criteria. Hence, the coefficient of a given
term can be interpreted as the percentage of
contribution of such term to the overall score. This
aspect is highly appreciated in practice because it
allows an analyst to understand each decision
behavior made by the algorithm when calculating a
global score between two entities.
Note that when defining interaction indices for pairs of
criteria, the only conditions one must verify are the addi-
tivity and monotonicity of the resulting measure. That is,
it is sufficient to verify that the following quantity is always







⎦ ≥ 0 (2)
4.2 Clustering results and experimental validation
The TRIAGE clustering tool identified 1,040 clusters that
consist of at least 5 scam emails correlated by various
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combinations of features. Because of the way these clus-
ters are generated (i.e., the multi-criteria aggregation),
we anticipate that these email clusters represent different
campaigns, potentially organized by the same individuals -
as emails within the same cluster share several common
traits.
Table 4 provides some global statistics computed across
the top-250 largest scam campaigns. In over half of these
campaigns, scammers are using only two distinct phone
numbers, but they still make use of more than five dif-
ferent mailboxes to get the answers from their victims.
Most scam campaigns are rather long-lived (lasting on
average about a year). We note that cluster sizes are small
on average, indicating that there are many small, isolated
campaigns and only a few dozens of messages belong
to the same campaign. This might be also an artefact
of the data collection process; nevertheless, we antici-
pate that this could also reflect the scammers’ behavior
who may want to stay ‘under the radar’. Indeed, bulk
amounts of the same emails would have more poten-
tial to compromise their scamming operations, as this
would become visible for content-based spam filters and,
hence, would get blocked on the earlier stages of email
filtering.
4.2.1 Assessment of clustering results
As data clustering is essentially an unsupervised classifica-
tion approach, it is important to assess clustering results
by means of objective criteria, so as to validate the sound-
ness of the results. There are mainly two approaches to
perform this validation: external or internal evaluation.
When there is no ‘ground truth’ information, we usu-
ally perform an internal evaluation of the clusters valid-
ity to confirm that the obtained results cannot have
reasonably occurred ‘by chance’, or as an artefact of
the clustering algorithm. Various cluster validity indices
have been proposed to assess the quality and consis-
tency of clustering results [31]. In graph clustering,
most indices are based on the comparison of intra-
cluster connectivity (i.e., the compactness of clusters) and
Table 4 Global statistics of the top 250 clusters
Statistic Average Median Maximum
Number of emails 38 28 376
Number of from 13.9 9 181
Number of replies 6.2 5 56
Number of subjects 9.9 7 114
Number of phones 2.5 2 34
Duration (in days) 396 340 1,454
Number of dates (distinct) 27.9 22 259
Compactness 2.5 2.4 5.0
the inter-cluster variability (i.e., the separability between
clusters).
To evaluate the quality of our clustering results, we have
examined their overall compactness, broken down by indi-
vidual features. The graph compactness (Cp) is a cluster
validity index that indicates how ‘compact’ (or homoge-
neous) the clusters are, based on their intra-connectivity
characteristics. Cp reflects the average edge similarity
between two objects of the cluster. More formally, for any
cluster Ck , we calculate a normalized compactness index,






Nk(Nk − 1)/2 , (3)
where ω(i, j) is a positive weight function reflecting node
similarities in the graph, andNk is the number ofmembers
within cluster k.
Figure 5 depicts graphically the overall Cp for the top 50
clusters. Besides a few exceptions, most clusters have an
average compactness value above 1.5, which in most cases
is associated with a combination of at least three strongly
correlated features.
Since the TRIAGE tool is keeping track of all individual
links in the similarity graphs, it is also possible to com-
pute the proportion of emails that are linked by specific
combinations of features within clusters. This can be very
useful to understand the reasons behind the formation of
the clusters, and hence provide insights into ‘stable’ (less
volatile) features used by scammers when performing new
campaigns.
From Table 5, we can observe that the top combination
of features that tend to link scam emails (in 13% of the
cases) involves the phone number, the subject, and also all
three email addresses (from, reply, email body) used by
the scammers. To confirm our intuition about the impor-
tance of certain features (phone numbers and, to a lesser
extent, email addresses) and their effective role in iden-
tifying campaigns, we look at all similarity links within
clusters. We observe that the features mainly respon-
sible for linking scam messages in the clusters involve
phone numbers (in 88% cases), followed by the reply email
address (for 66% of the links). Not surprisingly, the from
address (which can be easily spoofed) changes muchmore
often and is used as linking feature in only 46% of cluster
formations.
On the other hand, external validation techniques aim
at comparing the recovered clusters to an a priori known
structure. Given the knowledge of the ground truth class
assignments and the clustering algorithm assignments of
the same samples, external validationmetrics measure the
similarity of the two assignments based solely on clusters
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Figure 5 Overall compactness of the top 50 clusters (broken down by feature).
labels, and by ignoring permutations. Examples of well-
known external validation metrics include:
• The (Adjusted) Rand Index, which measures the
similarity of two clustering assignments, ignoring
permutations and with chance normalization;
• The Mutual Information based scores, which
compares two partitions based on (normalized)
entropy measurements;
• The Homogeneity, Completeness and V-measure,
which all measure some degree of agreement
between two clustering assignments by defining an
intuitive metric using conditional entropy analysis.
To further evaluate our clustering results, we have used
here the Adjusted Rand Index (ARI) to compare different
sets of clusters obtained by varying the parameters of the
data fusion model used as input to the TRIAGE algorithm.
The results of this comparison is shown in Table 6. Note
that ARI has
Table 5 Top coalitions of features across all clusters
Coalition Percentage (%)
(phone, subject, from, reply, email body) 13
(phone, reply, email body) 12
(phone, subject, reply, email body) 11




(phone, reply, subject) 4
(phone, reply, subject, from) 4
others 33
• A bounded range in [−1, 1]: negative values are bad
(independent labellings), similar clusterings have a
positive ARI, 1.0 is the perfect match score.
• Random (uniform) label assignments have an ARI
score close to 0.0, thanks to the
‘corrected-for-chance’ adjustment made in order to
reduce the effect of random labellings.
Overall, ARI and compactness validation indices indi-
cate that most clustering results are similar, although
they have obviously some matching differences with each
other. Still, we observe that removing one or the other
feature can greatly impact the data partitioning results,
leading in general to fewer, coarse-grained MDClusters.
Further, we compare our results to results achieved by
applying a different aggregation function. Weighted aver-
aging functions, such as Ordered Weighted Averaging
(OWA) or the weighted mean, can be quite convenient
aggregation functions when we deal with data fusion
tasks, in which criteria of interest are expressed with
numerical values (usually, in [0, 1]n). However, the weights
used in weighted mean (WM) and the ones defined for
the OWA operator play very different roles. Torra pro-
posed in [33] a generalization of both WM and OWA,
called Weighted OWA (WOWA). This aggregation func-
tion combines the advantages of both types of averaging
functions by allowing the user to quantify the reliability of
the information sources with a vector p (as the weighted
mean does), and at the same time, to weight the values in
relation to their relative position with a second vector w
(as the OWA operator).
The two analyses that include all features (Table 6),
Choquet and WOWA, are more similar - with an ARI of
0.68 - which seems to validate our selection of the features
set. Here we used a different method in order to compare
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Table 6 Experimental results of different feature sets and clustering algorithms
Threshold ARI Compactness MDC Clusters Emails (% of total) Features
Choquet 0.35 - 3.08 1,036 19,866 13,779 (39%) 6
Choquet, no phone 0.35 0.53 2.64 912 16,745 17,753 (50%) 5
Choquet, no emails 0.35 0.52 2.2 868 13,458 14,884 (42%) 4
Choquet, no subj. 0.35 0.55 2.63 1,034 17,918 17,287 (49%) 5
WOWA 0.5 - 3.3 1,012 21,775 16,920 (48%) 6
WOWA, no phone 0.6 0.56 2.98 1,393 18,032 11,103 (31%) 5
our analysis with another one as there is no other existent
previous work to which we could compare.
Since we have no ground truth, it is hard to reach a
final conclusion on which analysis is providing the best
results. However, the various quality measures presented
above (Cp and ARI), combined with the data set coverage
(proportion of clustered emails) provides a good indica-
tion of the results quality and a good confidence in the
parameters chosen.
4.3 On the role of emails and phone numbers
One could wonder about the longevity of these key scam
features; hence, we also looked at phone numbers and
email addresses from a time perspective. Figure 6 repre-
sents the usage of the same email addresses and phone
numbers over time. The Y -axis is density of the features
that indicates their distribution in time on a 100% scale. As
mentioned before, a larger part of them is used for only 1
day, so there is a slight concentration on the left side of the
plot. However, the phone numbers are more often reused
over time than email addresses. This could be explained
by an easy access to new mailboxes offered by many
free email providers. As for the phone, they probably still
require some financial investment compared with emails.
We checked the domain names of email addresses used
in our scam dataset and found that the top 100 belong
to webmail providers from all over the world. This find-
ing suggests that email messages sent from such accounts
would overpass sender-based anti-spam filters that are
widely deployed today.
If we represent a scatter plot of from email addresses















Figure 6 Duration of phone numbers and emails used by
scammers, in days.
we find that these two parameters are uncorrelated. There
are more changes performed with email addresses by
scammers than with phone numbers, and even larger
clusters of scammers sometimes maintain few email
addresses.
4.4 Clouds of words
419scam.org [4], as mentioned before, categorizes the
scam emails into 10 categories. We presented their shares
in the dataset in Section 3. Since the provided cate-
gorization is rather general, we wanted to evaluate by
ourselves the scam categories present in our dataset by
measuring the word frequencies in the body of the scam
messages. Hence, to extract some additional knowledge
from the clustered data, we create a list of the most
repetitive keywords (after removing all stop words) and
group them into meaningful categories. Stop words are
‘words which are filtered out prior to, or after, process-
ing of natural language data’ [34]. Examples of such words
in English could be short function words as the follow-
ing: a, which, this, was, etc. By removing such words
from the text, we took into account only words contain-
ing some knowledge about the topic discussed in the
message.
As a result, we identified three big categories within the
clusters: money transfer and bank-related fraud schemes
(54%), fake lottery scam (22%), and fake delivery services
(11%). The rest is uncategorized and refers to 13% of the
clusters. The distribution is quite similar to the one pro-
vided by the data source, except that the delivery services
are separated into other categories. The so-called gen-
eral 419 scam category corresponds to messages about
lost bank payments, compensations, and investment pro-
posals. We grouped them together as it is challenging to
clearly separate them due to a large number of shared
keywords.
5 Characterization of campaigns
This section provides deeper insights into 419 scam cam-
paign orchestration.We present several typical scam cam-
paigns and show the connections between clusters, which
are possibly run by the same group of scammers due
to multiple strong interconnections among scam emails
belonging to the same cluster.
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Figure 7 Number of distinct From addresses versus the number of phones used in the clusters. Each node represents a cluster. Node size
indicates the number of emails.
5.1 Scam campaign examples
Here we characterize 419 scam campaigns by looking
at how they are operated. For this purpose we use data
visualization tools to plot the clustered data in an orga-
nized manner and look at the ‘big picture’. Campaign
graphs are likely reflecting the organization of campaigns
and their maintenance over time. Interestingly, various
campaigns have different operational structures and man-
age resources differently, as depicted by the examples in
Figure 8.
Figures 8, 9, 10 and 11 show examples of different
scam campaigns identified by TRIAGE. These diagrams
were created using graph visualization tools developed
in the VIS-SENSE project2. The graph diagrams are
drawn using a circular layout that represents the var-
ious dates on which scam messages were sent. The
dates are laid out starting from 9 o’clock (far left in
the graph) and are growing clockwise. The other clus-
ter nodes, which highlight other email features and their
relationships, are drawn using a force-directed node
placement algorithm. The big nodes in the graphs refer
to phone numbers and from addresses. The smaller
nodes represent mostly subjects and email addresses
found in the reply and from fields, or in the message
content.
5.1.1 ESKOM campaign
Figure 9 is an example of a 419 scam campaign quite likely
orchestrated by the same cyber criminals. This campaign
actually consists of two sub-campaigns: firstly, a 1-year
fake lottery campaign located in the upper-left part of the
graph (Figure 9); secondly, a 1.5-year campaign imperson-
ating ESKOM Holdings, an electricity company in South
Africa.
Even though scammers changed the topic of their scam,
they kept re-using the very same phone number (rep-
resented in the center of the diagram). A noteworthy
aspect of this campaign, shared with other campaigns we
found, is that it relies on a few from email addresses (i.e.,
the bigger nodes in the figure). A set of email addresses
for reply and body was used in this campaign, however,
since the switch of the scam topic a set of mailboxes
and subjects has also changed. Also, we observe that the
load of the scam campaign is well distributed over time,
and does not exhibit very high peaks on specific dates,
hence keeping very low volumes of emails sent. Finally,
the from email accounts used by scammers in this case are
mostly Gmail accounts. As we have no sender IP infor-
mation, we could not verify if these were spoofed or not.
However, in case these are genuine email accounts, this
suggests that scammers use such webmail accounts for
long periods of time while staying unnoticed by the email
providers.
5.1.2 Sify-Rolex campaign
A similar campaign, presented in Figure 8A, illustrates
the roles of email addresses and phone numbers in
419 scam. This campaign, which lasted for 1.5 years,
changed topic five times at a frequency of 1 to 2
months, which is visible in the Figure by looking at




Figure 8 Examples of other scam campaign structures. (A) Distinct sub-campaigns, connected through a phone number. (B) A diverse iPhone
scam campaign. (C) International campaign operated in China, UK, and the Netherlands. (D) Spanish lottery campaign often changing phone
numbers and email addresses.
the larger subgroups placed around the circle. These
shorter sub-campaigns were most probably run by the
same group of scammers as the same phone number
was reused over all campaigns. Inversely, we observe
that the email addresses and subjects were completely
changed as scammers were moving from one campaign to
another.
Moreover, these email addresses were often selected to
match the campaign topic and subjects, probably to make
the scam messages appear authentic.
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Figure 9 Lotteries (between 9 and 12 o’clock) and ESKOMHoldings impersonation.
5.1.3 iPhone campaign
While we observed a large number of such easily distin-
guishable campaigns, we also identified a very different,
more ‘chaotic’ type of patterns reflecting a very different
modus operandi, as demonstrated with the graphical illus-
tration in Figure 8B. This diagram shows a cluster repre-
senting a recent campaign of iPhone-related scams, which
lasted for over 1.5 years. The communication infrastruc-
ture of the scammers operating this campaign is much
more diverse - around 85 unique email accounts were used
in this campaign. Moreover, it relies on a large number
of ‘disposable’ email addresses, which are typically used
only once and seldom reused for a long period of time. As
opposed to previous examples, however, the same or quite
similar subjects and from email address were often reused,
as well as the very same two phone numbers.
5.1.4 Internationally-operated campaigns campaign
Some scam campaigns still lack organization and do
not always exhibit very clearly separated patterns, as
illustrated by two campaigns depicted in Figures 8C
and 8D. Both seem to use fewer email addresses but many
different phone numbers are changing over time. The first
one is an international campaign that started with Chinese
phone numbers (top-left part), then moved to UK-based
anonymous proxy numbers (top-right part), and ended
with Dutch-based phone numbers. Almost all analyzed
features changed over time, except a single from address.
Interestingly, most of the phone numbers were regularly
switched over time.
We also note that both campaigns exploit fake lot-
tery topics. For example, the second one represents a
Spanish fake lottery campaign that uses topic-related
email addresses (again, in order to look more legitimate),
and scammers leverage up to 11 different Spanish phone
numbers, which are also regularly changed over time in
the campaign. In the middle of the diagram, we can see
a larger node representing an email subject that has been
reused in a large number of scam emails during this cam-
paign, showing that scammers were probably reusing the
same fake lottery email template for all these emails. How-
ever, this type of scam cluster illustrates well the chal-
lenge of identifying such dynamic campaigns, in which
the links between scam emails originating from the same
criminal group are constantly changing over time. This
supports our choice of using a multi-dimensional cluster-
ing tool, which can not only take into account multiple
features but can also identify groups of emails that are
linked by varying sets of commonalities (i.e., more volatile
features). These complex patterns and this volatility in
email attributes can also suggest that cyber criminals
operate in separate groups, where each group manages
its own set of mailboxes and phone number(s); however,
these groups are somehow federated and are collaborating
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Figure 10 An example of macro-cluster, which consists of 6 different scam campaigns. The nodes laid in clockwise fashion reflect the timeline
of the campaigns.
with each other, for example by sharing the same email
templates, same distribution lists, or exchanging new
scam topics.
5.2 Macro-clusters: connecting sub-campaigns
At the next step, we looked at scam campaigns from
a broader perspective: by searching for loosely inter-
connected clusters. The goal was to pinpoint possibly
larger-scale campaigns, which are made of weakly inter-
connected scam operations (i.e. different scam runs). For
this purpose, we only used email addresses and phone
numbers, since the other attributes are not considered
as personally identifiable information. In fact, we looked
for clusters that share at least one email address and/or
phone number, and use this information to build so-called
macro-clusters.
As a result, we identified a set 845 isolated clusters,
and another set of 195 connected clusters, where the lat-
ter consists of 62 macro-clusters. The characteristics of
the top six macro-campaigns are shown in Table 7. These
macro-clusters are particularly interesting as they con-
sist of a set of scam campaigns that appear to be loosely
interconnected and therefore could be also orchestrated
by the same cybercriminals. In fact, the links between
different scam clusters were considered too weak by the
clustering algorithm, because of the decision scheme and
thresholds set as parameters, and thus these various scam
runs were eventually grouped into separate clusters. How-
ever, these weak links can be easily recovered, and it
is then up to the analyst to investigate how meaning-
ful these interconnections really are. Indeed, we believe
that it is much easier for a cyber investigator to start































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 11 An example of macro-cluster, which consists of 14 sub-campaigns. The nodes laid in clockwise fashion reflect the timeline of the
campaigns.
from a set of really meaningful scam clusters, to gradu-
ally increase the decision thresholds up to the point where
she can decide herself to stop merging data clusters, as
it might not be meaningful any more to attribute further
different campaigns to the same group due to a lack of
evidence.
Macro-clusters usually span across long time periods
and exhibit various bursts of emails reflecting different
campaigns, which use various topics and can even be
operated in different countries. An example of a macro-
campaign is illustrated in Figure 10, where it consists of
six different scam campaigns of various sizes that include
UK and Nigerian phone numbers.
We can easily distinguish them in the diagram as they
appear as separate subgroups, each one having one or two
bigger nodes (representing phone numbers reused mul-
tiple times) and a tail of connected nodes representing a
series of from email addresses.
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Table 7 Macro-clusters, mean values of attributes
Number Number of Phones Mailboxes Subjects Duration Countries Topics
campaigns (years)
1 14 44 677 223 4 4 Lottery, lost funds, investments
2 43 163 1,127 463 4 7 Lottery, banks, diplomats, FBI
3 6 18 128 80 4 4 Lottery
4 5 8 111 51 3.5 2 Packaging, lottery, loans
5 6 7 201 96 1 1 Lottery, UPS & WU delivery
6 4 7 82 33 2 1 Diplomats, monetary
and payments scam
Notice that campaigns in this case are well separated
with respect to phone numbers and emails, which are ded-
icated to each campaign (or operation), and the overlaps
between campaigns are quite limited. However, there is a
small node just in the center that indicates how these are
interconnected (through a common from email address).
Some contact details were also reused and we used that
for grouping them together. All together, these campaigns
lasted for almost 3.5 years. Over this rather long time
period, scammers have sent emails using 51 distinct sub-
jects and 8 different phone numbers. This diversity of
the topics suggests that there might be some competition
among them, as they try to cover different online trick
schemes instead of specializing in a single one.
Another example of a macro-campaign is illustrated in
Figure 11, which consists of 14 sub-campaigns that can be
more or less identified in the diagram as separate groups
revolving around different phone numbers. Each one has
a few dedicated phone numbers (44 in total) and its own
set of from, reply, and embedded email addresses. How-
ever, in this case it appears that scammers were operating
these different scam runs sequentially, sometimes reusing
certain resources of previous campaigns. Hence, in foren-
sic investigations, it might be necessary to look some-
times at weaker links that may possibly connect together
some individuals or criminal groups that could be crime
associates.
5.3 Geographical distribution of campaigns
To better understand how scammers operate geographi-
cally, we look at the data from a different angle. We have
represented the scam email distribution per country for
three subsets of our original data in Figure 12: (i) for the
complete dataset (light grey), (ii) for scam clusters (dark
grey), and (iii) for macro-clusters (black). As we can see,
most campaigns identified through scam clusters origi-
nate either from African countries or from anonymized
UK numbers. The difference between the light grey and
dark grey bars in Figure 12 probably indicates a large num-
ber of stealthier or isolated scammers, as they do not form
any cluster. Those quite likely refer to unorganized, oppor-
tunistic scammers, or maybe smaller gangs that operate in
a loosely organised fashion.
Another interesting point is that macro-clusters (black
bars) cover African and most of the European campaigns,
forming bigger clusters potentially pointing to large orga-
nized groups of accomplices.
Organizing such macro-campaigns might be more ex-
pensive and difficult to operate, requiring more people








































Figure 12 Scam email distribution by country for the largest scam clusters.



















Figure 13 Top six macro-clusters: country distribution versus phone number count.
languages. Yet, these macro-campaigns are likely to be
much more profitable, especially for the top-level leaders
of these gangs.
We next look in more detail into the specific origins
of macro-campaigns. Figure 13 shows the country dis-
tribution, versus phone number count, for the top 6
macro-campaigns. The last three campaigns are almost
exclusively based in Africa, furthermore in only one or two
countries, assuming that anonymised UK phone numbers
are most probably used by scammers located in Africa
and hiding behind these European phone numbers. The
first three campaigns are more biased towards Europe, yet
with strong connections to Nigeria and Benin. From an in-
depth analysis, we conclude that these groups are compet-
ing in several ‘fake lottery’-related scam, with the second
group leading the pack and coveringmost of the countries.
In comparison to the previous study of scam campaign
[5], we observed much less UK and Nigerian numbers per
group, and confirm that large-scale scam campaigns can
be distributed over several continents. Indeed, the largest
macro-campaign identified (#2) seems to be orches-
trated by people distributed in many countries, if we
assume also that that mobile phones are rarely used out-
side its country of origin (as highlighted by previous
research [5]).
6 Conclusions
In this study, we empirically demonstrated the existence
of 419 scam campaigns and a crucial role the phone
numbers and email addresses play in 419 email scam busi-
ness, in contrast to other cybercriminal schemes where
email addresses may be often spoofed and phone numbers
rarely used. With the help of a multi-dimensional cluster-
ing technique for grouping similar emails, we identified
around 1,000 of 419 scam campaigns.
We presented in detail several examples of 419 scam
campaigns, some of which lasted for several years - rep-
resenting them in a graphical way and discussing their
characteristics. Finally, we uncovered the existence of
macro-campaigns, groups of loosely linked together cam-
paigns that are probably run by the same people. We
found that some of these macro-campaigns are geograph-
ically spread over several countries, both African and
European. We showed that infrastructure, orchestration,
and modus operandi of such campaigns differ from tra-
ditional spam campaigns: campaigns are long and scarce,
they extensively use anonymization tools like webmail
accounts for hiding IPs and anonymous proxy phone
numbers. Our analysis has unveiled a high diversity in
scam orchestration methods, showing that scammer(s)
can work on various topics within a campaign, thus
probably competing with each other over trendy scam
topics.
We believe that our methods and findings could be
leveraged to improve investigations of various cyber crime
schemes - other than scam campaigns as well.
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